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Abstract The international governance landscape on climate change mitigation is 
increasingly complex across multiple governance levels. Climate change mitigation ini-
tiatives by non-state stakeholders can play an important role in governing global climate 
change. The article addresses the relationship between intergovernmental and transna-
tional governance processes in global climate governance. Particularly, the article aims to 
complement existing research on the role of “orchestration” by and through the UNFCCC 
process by focusing on how successful transnational initiatives can resonate within the 
intergovernmental negotiation process in order to inspire more ambitious climate action 
also on the part of national governments. This issue is addressed by systematically analys-
ing interdependencies between transnational and international governance. Building on a 
structurational regime model, the article develops a theory of change of how and through 
which structuration channels non-state initiatives can contribute to changing the politics of 
international climate policy, traces existing UNFCCC processes and the Paris Agreement 
with a view to identifying inroads for a more direct feedback from non-state initiatives and 
derives recommendations on how and under which agenda items positive experiences can 
resonate within the UNFCCC negotiation process.
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The global governance landscape has shifted significantly in recent years. More traditional 
intergovernmental organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), World 
Bank and the United Nations’ Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are 
complemented by an increasingly complex patchwork of transnational governance initia-
tives (e.g. Abbott 2012; Bulkeley et al. 2014; IPCC 2014; Jordan et al. 2015; Newell et al. 
2012). This is particularly true for climate change governance in which an increasingly 
complex governance landscape has emerged (Pattberg and Widerberg 2017) in part as a 
response to a lack of a comprehensive multilateral agreement after the “diplomatic dis-
aster” (Grubb 2010, p. 127) of the Copenhagen climate conference (see Bäckstrand et al. 
2017).
The successful adoption of the Paris Agreement at the  21st Conference of the Parties of 
the UNFCCC marks another point of inflection for global climate governance. The Paris 
Agreement explicitly acknowledges the existence and value of the wider international cli-
mate regime complex, but it may also redefine the configuration and interdependencies 
within it. With its 5-yearly cycle of NDCs (Art. 4), international review under the Agree-
ments transparency mechanism (Art. 13) and global stocktakes of collective progress (Art. 
14) the Paris Agreement deploys a “pacemaker” (Hermwille 2016a) that stimulates and 
synchronises climate policy making on the national, transnational and international lev-
els (UNFCCC 2016a). It creates periodic political moments, each of which can move the 
world closer to an incrementally more sustainable and ultimately carbon-free future. How-
ever, actors from all political levels are needed to breathe life into these political moments.
Transnational climate initiatives and non-state actors can play a role in fostering the 
required momentum. In fact, non-state and subnational actors are becoming more and more 
salient also on the global level. The UNFCCC Secretariat’s NAZCA (Non-State Actor 
Zone for Climate Action) platform currently (January 2018) features commitments to cli-
mate action from more than 12,500 companies, cities, subnational, regions, investors, and 
civil society organisations (UNFCCC 2018). While the effectiveness of such initiatives is 
extremely difficult to assess (Bulkeley et al. 2014; Widerberg and Stripple 2016) and first 
assessments provide very mixed evidence on the potential for transnational climate initia-
tives to contribute to closing the “mitigation gap” left by a lack of mitigation ambition 
on the part of national commitments (Graichen et al. 2016; Michaelowa and Michaelowa 
2017; Roelfsema et  al. 2018). Even if transnational governance initiatives are success-
ful and help implementing effective climate change mitigation, there may be a risk that 
transnational governance may crowd out ambition at the national level. On the other hand, 
Cao and Ward argue that “transnational ties do more than link the organisations directly 
involved. They are conduits through which information can flow between countries, linking 
organisations not directly involved in TCG [(transnational climate governance)]. As such, 
they present the possibility of diffusion of policy and learning (Cao and Ward 2017, p. 97). 
In that sense transnational governance initiatives may have effects beyond the realisation of 
direct emission reductions.
This article theorises and empirically assesses the influence that (effective) transnational 
governance processes may have on the intergovernmental negotiations under the UNFCCC 
and the Paris Agreement (see Betsill 2015). While much has been said about “orchestra-
tion” (Abbott 2012; Abbott et al. 2015; Chan and Pauw 2014; Hale and Roger 2014), these 
works typically focus on the more visible task of a conductor: giving directions. This paper 
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instead focuses on the essential capacity of an orchestrator to listen and perceive what is 
happening among those who are being orchestrated.
The article will apply a structurational regime model (Sect. 2) to theorise the relation-
ship between transnational governance processes and the intergovernmental negotiations 
under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. The structurational regime model (on the 
basis of Arts 2000; Hermwille et al. 2017) suggests that adequate feedback from success-
ful transnational climate action into the intergovernmental negotiations could facilitate 
increased ambition also on the part of nation states in current and subsequent NDC cycles. 
Yet, as our empirical discussion of non-state and subnational actors within the UNFCCC 
process (Sect.  3) demonstrates, mechanisms of continuous feedback through monitoring 
and reporting, and in particular periodical reflection and re-evaluation of the set goals as 
well as the practices of implementation with respect to transnational governance initiatives 
is still largely missing at the intergovernmental level. The current institutional set-up of the 
UNFCCC resembles a structurational one-way street: the UNFCCC orchestrates transna-
tional governance initiatives to some extent but there are hardly any mechanisms to feed 
back immediately into the intergovernmental process. Section 4 discusses how this deficit 
could be remedied and suggest potential inroads in the ongoing negotiations to create such 
structurational short-cuts so as to maximise “catalytic linkages” (Betsill 2015) between the 
transnational and intergovernmental realms. Section 5 concludes.
2  Theorising complex climate governance
2.1  The increasingly complex climate governance landscape and the role 
of non‑state actors
The global climate governance landscape has seen substantial changes in recent years. 
While up until the late 1990s, scholars of international environmental governance tried to 
develop recommendations or design principles for institutional design of integrated issue-
specific multilateral regimes (McGinnis and Ostrom 1996; e.g. Wettestad 1999; Young 
1997) it soon became clear that such hoping for silver bullet international agreements may 
have been somewhat naive. As Young notes: “it is unlikely that we will be able to formu-
late a set of simple generalisations that spell out necessary conditions for success in efforts 
to create international regimes or to operate them effectively” (Young 1997, p. 214). In 
fact, the global governance landscape is to some extent emergent (c.f. De Búrca et al. 2014, 
pp. 3–4). Research interest has therefore shifted towards describing a trend of increasing 
“fragmentation” (e.g. Biermann et al. 2009; Pattberg et al. 2014; Zelli 2011) or increasing 
“polycentricity” (Jordan et al. 2015; Oberthür 2016; Ostrom 2014) of the global govern-
ance architecture and an analysis of the consequences thereof including investigating the 
institutional interplay between various elements of the regime complex (e.g. Oberthür and 
Gehring 2006).
It has been argued that the benefits of the more divers regime complex can be increased 
if the various governance initiatives are to some extent “orchestrated” (Abbott 2012; 
Abbott et al. 2015; Chan and Pauw 2014; Hale and Roger 2014). “Orchestration”, in the 
terms of Abbott et al. (2015), specifies a soft and indirect mode of governance as opposed 
to more hierarchical hard and direct modes. It builds on coexistence and complementarity 
rather than competing forms of governance. Moreover, the increasing plurality in the cli-
mate governance landscape allows to experiment with innovative policies and governance 
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approaches (Hoffmann 2011; Jordan and Huitema 2014). Some authors therefore go one 
step further by proposing “experimentalist governance” as a “a recursive process of pro-
visional goal setting and revision based on learning from comparison of alternative 
approaches to advancing these goals in different contexts” (Overdevest and Zeitlin 2014, p. 
25; see also De Búrca et al. 2014; Sabel and Zeitlin 2008, 2012).
The Paris Agreement now adds a regime layer of central intergovernmental governance 
to the emerging transnational regime complex. This challenges us to think about the rela-
tionships and interdependencies between the two. The Paris Agreement, with its long-term 
goals, the open-ended framework and its transparency mechanism can fulfil some of the 
“key deliberation-fostering steps” entailed by an ideal typical experimentalist regime (De 
Búrca et al. 2014, p. 478), not only for nation states but, as a common reference point, also 
for other forms of governance. It can help develop a broadly shared perception of the prob-
lem at hand, and it establishes the accord of a dynamic and open-ended framework, and 
sets goals at the aggregate level. It also stipulates the implementation of these goals at sub-
ordinate (national) level taking into account context-specific circumstances and explicitly 
welcomes the contributions of non-state and subnational actors.
While the different contributions reviewed above by and large focussed on the structure 
of the international governance landscape—be it in descriptive or in normative terms—
another stream of literature has focussed on the role of agency of non-state actors within 
the international regime, particularly within the UNFCCC negotiations. Building on the 
pioneering work of Newell (2000), there has been considerable academic interest in the 
role of non-state actors, in particular environmental NGOs, business representatives and 
academics, within the UNFCCC negotiations. The majority of these works conceptualised 
non-state actors as lobbyists or “NGO diplomats” (Betsill and Corell 2008, p. 3). Schroeder 
and Lovell (2012), for example, have studied how observers can and do influence the ongo-
ing negotiations through official side-events that complement the formal negotiations at 
each Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC. These works concur in that they 
recognise the influence of non-state actors on the negotiations, in particular through influ-
encing the agenda of ongoing negotiations (Betsill and Corell 2008; Nasiritousi et  al. 
2016). Moreover, they find that COPs have become “mega events where global agendas are 
set, thinking is joined-up and leadership emerges” (Schroeder and Lovell 2012, p. 26; see 
also Aykut et al. 2017).
The insights generated by this stream of literature do provide a compelling perspective. 
Yet this perspective is only a partial one. It portrays non-state actors as political actors that 
aim to influence national governments. This, however, is not necessarily a primary inten-
tion of many non-state and subnational actors that have become governors in their own 
right (see Kuyper et al. 2018). There is a need to look into “catalytic linkages” between the 
intergovernmental and transnational realms that go beyond non-state actor participation in 
side-events and lobbyism in the negotiation hallways (Betsill 2015).
2.2  A structurational regime model of the UNFCCC: justification
In order to describe the impact of transnational climate initiatives on the intergovern-
mental process, a theory of decision making is required that allows both to conceptual-
ise agency with non-state and subnational actors as well as nation states. Notably, most 
literature studying regime complexes still relies on state-centric ontologies (see Jordan 
et al. 2015; Schroeder and Lovell 2012). Moreover, for the purpose of this paper, a tem-
poral perspective is required since the Paris Agreement is a dynamic and open-ended 
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legal framework and the impact that transnational governance initiatives can have on 
future NDC cycles is of particular interest. Last but not least, the model needs to bal-
ance structure and agency in a nuanced way. A deterministic structure-based ontology 
would exclude the possibility of successful bottom-up governance initiatives while a 
strictly agency-focussed approach would most likely underrate the influence of inter-
national law and environmental multilateralism in legitimising and structuring climate 
action.
For the purposes of this article, a structurational regime model (Arts 2000) appears to 
be particularly suitable as it meets the above mentioned requirements (see Okereke et al. 
2009; Wendt 1987). Structuration theory provides an ontological foundation that can 
accommodate all three requirements: explicit modelling of non-state/subnational actors 
as “governors” (Okereke et al. 2009, p. 61), temporal dynamics, and balancing structure 
and agency. Structuration theory has been developed precisely to bridge the structure-
agency divide. It argues for a duality of agency and structure, “agents and structures 
are not kept apart but […] are mutually constitutive of each other” (Stones 2005, p. 
21). Individual behaviour is co-determined by the structures in which all agents oper-
ate and in turn actions change or reproduce structures. Giddens specifies three modes 
of structuration (Giddens 1984): domination as authoritative or allocative power/con-
trol over resources and legitimation (norms) and signification (collective meaning) as 
the rules or, as Sewell (2005) calls it, cognitive “schemas”. In acting, agents reproduce 
and thereby reinforce these structures of domination, legitimation and signification and 
hence close the cycle of structuration. Structuration theory provides a nuanced concep-
tualisation of structure and agency and the iterative, morphogenetic structuration cycle 
is inherently temporal (Sewell 2005).
A structurational approach may also help to accommodate the role(s) of various rele-
vant actors in international climate policy beyond the nation state (Okereke et al. 2009). 
Arts (2000) developed a structurational regime model precisely for this purpose and 
Hermwille et al. (2017) have modified and applied it to analyse the recent development 
of the UNFCCC negotiation process. This structurational regime model will also inform 
the subsequent analysis in this article.
In a nutshell, the structurational regime model argues that politics (in this case inter-
national climate policy) is a means to change (unsustainable) structures deliberately and 
through a formalised process. As Hermwille et al. (2017) argue, the UNFCCC and the 
associated policy processes mostly fail to provide structure by the mode of domination 
(mainly due to the anarchic character of the concert of sovereign states), but do provide 
signification and legitimation. “The UNFCCC structures agency at various levels and 
through various channels. It structures agency at the level of nation states and through 
the nation states, through the implementation of treaties and subsequently implement-
ing decisions in the respective national laws of the parties to the treaty. But the UNF-
CCC also structures the behaviour of the other constituents of socio-economic systems 
directly by providing shared signification and legitimation to transnational and subna-
tional institutions as well as to corporations, consumers and citizens” (Hermwille et al. 
2017, p. 3).
It is important to note that the signification and legitimation provided by the UNFCCC 
are not unique. They intersect with a multiplicity of other structures, sometimes in a com-
peting and sometimes in a complementary way (see Sewell 2005). Also, the policy pro-
cess is itself subject to structure and follows certain formal and informal rules. “The key 
actors in the negotiations, government officials, diplomats and ministers, but also partici-
pants from civil society, business organisations, international organisations, and academia, 
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all draw on rules and resources embedded in their respective structures” (Hermwille et al. 
2017, p. 4).
2.3  The structurational regime model in application
Having introduced the ontological foundations of the analysis, we can now turn to the 
specific case and derive a simple structuration model of global climate regime complex 
which includes transnational climate initiatives as a locus of agency. As outlined above, 
structuration occurs through repeated interaction, of agents taking decisions enabled and/or 
constrained by existing structures and thereby reinforcing structures both for themselves as 
well as for others (Stones 2005). Developing an applied model therefore needs to focus on 
the various channels of interaction or “structuration channels” among and between actors. 
Figure 1 below illustrates relevant channels of structuration and interdependencies within 
the UNFCCC.
Decisions at the UNFCCC are ultimately taken by individuals—delegates of govern-
ments of the member states. These negotiators are typically authorised by a negotiation 
mandate provided by their respective national government. Negotiation mandates vary 
in how widely or narrowly defined they are, but even in relatively narrowly defined man-
dates, i.e. mandates that feature numerous explicitly defined “red lines”, negotiators typi-
cally have some freedom to bargain and approve of compromises if necessary. Within their 
remaining room to manoeuvre, it is reasonable to assume that negotiators will take into 
account both dynamics and the rules of the game (North 1990) of the acute negotiations 
under the UNFCCC as well as structures emanating from their respective national dis-
courses (Milkoreit 2017).
Alongside negotiators, national governments therefore remain a decisive factor and 
locus of agency in the proposed model. Under the Paris Agreement, Parties are obliged to 
Fig. 1  Schematic illustration of 
the channels and interdependen-
cies of the structuration cycle 
in the context of the UNFCCC. 
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“prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions […
and to] pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of 
such contributions” (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 4.2). As the name indicates, these so-called 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) are determined in sovereign capitals and not 
under international law and the immediate negotiation pressure of a UNFCCC Conference 
of the Parties. The article therefore conceptualises them as a separate channel of structura-
tion (see Fig. 1).
Both negotiators and the national government are influenced to some extent by their 
respective national discourse. The national discourse and dominant narratives therein 
delimit the scope of the “politically feasible”. Ultimately, politicians need to provide mean-
ingful explanations for their decisions and these explanations need to resonate in the politi-
cal discourse of their countries. If not, legitimation will erode and at least in a democratic 
system, political power will hardly endure without legitimation (see Miskimmon et  al. 
2013).
National discourses are also not independent from structuration. The UNFCCC and the 
associated processes also deliver norms and collective meaning that provide a certain dis-
cursive structure including for wider political discourses. A key example here would be the 
2 °C limit which has been strongly engrained by the UNFCCC as a widely shared norm 
(Hermwille et al. 2017; Morseletto et al. 2016).
Building on this understanding of the general structuration processes within and beyond 
the UNFCCC, we can now turn to the role of transnational climate initiatives in the inter-
governmental negotiation process. Transnational climate initiatives interact with three 
elements of the regime model: they allow for structuration by influencing national gov-











































Fig. 2  Structuration channels and interdependencies of transnational climate initiatives and the intergov-
ernmental negotiations under the UNFCCC. Arrows indicate structuration channels
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directly at the UNFCCC level (see discussion below). These connections are indicated by 
the arrows depicted in Fig. 2 below.
Successful climate initiatives can influence national discourses in at least two ways. 
Firstly, they can ease some of the distributive burden implied in some mitigation instru-
ments such as, for example, emissions trading: if transnational climate initiatives are 
successful in abating greenhouse gas emission, this can reduce the required mitigation 
effort in other parts of the economy of a given country, making more ambitious overall 
mitigation goals more attainable politically and economically.
Secondly, transnational climate initiatives can contribute not only by mitigating 
greenhouse gas emissions but also as originators or contributors of transformational 
change. The scope and diversity of transnational climate initiatives is tremendous (e.g. 
Bulkeley et al. 2014; Jordan et al. 2015; Widerberg and Pattberg 2015), but at least some 
initiatives may create socio-technical niches, protected spaces, that allow to experiment 
with and further develop new and sustainable ideas, artefacts and practices (Smith 2007; 
Smith and Raven 2012). Growing evidence from the field of transition research suggests 
that innovations developed in niches are the essential “seeds of transition” (Geels and 
Schot 2010, p. 24), but without an appropriate socio-political environment they cannot 
sprout (Geels and Schot 2010). In demonstrating the feasibility and economic viability 
of mitigation activities, transnational initiatives can help to establish new narratives in 
the national political discourse and thus allow to reshape the room of the politically fea-
sible (Hermwille 2016b; Miskimmon et al. 2013).
Influence on national governments is considered to be much more intermediate, but 
can occur when successful initiatives create and reinforce epistemic communities (Haas 
1992) or powerful instrumental constituencies (Voß and Simons 2014) that include gov-
ernment officials, consultants and bureaucrats.
With respect to the structuration channels between the transnational level and the 
intergovernmental negotiation process under the UNFCCC, the account of the role 
of non-state and subnational actors in the UNFCCC negotiations indicates that struc-
turation flows only in one direction (hence the arrow in Fig. 2). The UNFCCC clearly 
recognises the many complementary governance initiatives and consequently to some 
extent the de facto emergence of an increasingly polycentric climate governance sys-
tem. The decisions accompanying the Paris Agreement explicitly welcome the efforts 
of non-Party stakeholders (UNFCCC 2016b, paras. 117, 133). Parties decided even to 
launch a work programme on capacity building with the aim of “[f]ostering global, 
regional, national and subnational cooperation” (UNFCCC 2016b, para. 73d). It is also 
quite clear that normative goals set out by UNFCCC such as the 2  °C limit, the call 
for achieving a balance between anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and remov-
als by sinks in the second half of the century (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 4), and the goal to 
make “finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions 
and climate-resilient development” (UNFCCC 2016a, Art 2.1c) legitimise the efforts of 
non-Party actors (see Hermwille et al. 2017).
The structurational regime model suggests that immediate feedback from the transna-
tional level could help improve overall climate governance, ensuring that advances made 
on the transnational level—either in terms of accelerated implementation or successful 
experiments with policy innovation—are duly taken into account and do not crowd out 
ambition on the part of the nation states (see Meadows 1999). Yet, as the empirical analy-
sis of the subsequent section will demonstrate, advances made by transnational climate ini-
tiatives echo primarily on the national level and therefore at best reproduce and reinforce 
structures only indirectly with regard to the UNFCCC. There are very limited inroads for 
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transnational climate initiatives to immediately feed back into the intergovernmental nego-
tiation process.
3  Empirical relations between the transnational, international 
and national realms of climate governance
3.1  Transnational climate initiatives within the UNFCCC 
The subsequent section provides a brief account of formal and informal interactions among 
non-state and subnational actors on the one hand and the intergovernmental negotiation 
process on the other hand. It is based on the author’s regular participation in UNFCCC 
conferences at the annual COPs and intersessional meetings, review of the coverage of 
UNFCCC negotiations by the Earth Negotiation Bulletin (IISD Reporting Services 2018) 
as well as “crowdsourced” minutes from relevant negotiation sessions circulated by various 
members of the Climate Action Network (CAN). In order to further substantiate the above 
mentioned information and to triangulate initial findings, four additional expert interviews 
were held with a member of the French delegation for COP21 (expert A), a senior legal 
advisor to the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) negotiation group (expert B), and 
two staff members of the UNFCCC Secretariat (experts C & D). All interviewees were 
closely involved in the respective processes described below.1
Until fairly recently, the recognition and engagement of trans- and subnational climate 
initiatives was hardly institutionalised under the UNFCCC. Given the intergovernmental 
nature of the UNFCCC, the status of non-state actors is originally limited to an observer 
role. In the past, there had not been many avenues for successful transnational climate ini-
tiatives to communicate their achievements into the UNFCCC process, apart from pres-
entations at side-events. One way of formal recognition would have been via the national 
communications of the parties. The template for national communications foresees a chap-
ter on subnational activities, but arguably, it would be rather difficult to adequately present 
border-crossing transnational initiatives as subnational activities. What is more, national 
communications are typically filed and stored after the review process but have little reso-
nance within the intergovernmental negotiations.
However, in recent years, there was growing attention and appreciation of transnational 
climate initiatives in one particular negotiation stream under the UNFCCC. The Ad hoc 
Working Group on the Durban Platform (ADP) that carried out the negotiations in the run-
up to the COP21 in Paris was organised along two negotiation tracks: Workstream 1 was 
tasked to negotiate what became the Paris Agreement and Workstream 2 started out as a 
process to negotiate new and increased mitigation commitments for industrialised (Annex 
1) countries for the time before 2020. Workstream 2 was not successful in that regard, but 
at least in part as a response to the lack of progress the focus of the workstream changed 
considerably and added some novel aspects to the UNFCCC negotiations: it created a room 
to explore the contributions of international and transnational climate initiatives in closing 
the “mitigation gap” between the pledges of industrialised countries and the atmospheric 
1 The interviews were held on 2 February 2017 (expert A), 8 February 2017 (expert B), and 22 February 
2017 (experts C & D) respectively. They were conducted by telephone in semi-structured fashion. Audio 
recordings are available from the author upon request.
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needs to limit global warming to 1.5/2  °C above pre-industrial levels (Ott et  al. 2014; 
Widerberg and Pattberg 2015).
The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) had proposed to convene a series of techni-
cal expert meetings (TEMs), in order to create a space for non-political and facilitative dis-
cussions (expert B). The first of these meetings was successfully held at COP19 in Warsaw 
2013 as an in-session workshop on urbanisation and the role of subnational governments in 
facilitating climate action in cities (Sterk et al. 2013). Building on this positive experience, 
parties agreed to continue this format also during the intersessional meetings in 2014 and 
at COP20 in Lima. While the first TEMs were rather generic in nature, in Lima, Parties 
decided to advance from the exchange of information to a more action-oriented approach. 
Specifically, they agreed to build on the results of earlier TEMs, to go into more detail and 
to “focus on actionable policy options” (UNFCCC 2015, para. 19).
The mandate of the ADP which had housed the TEMs in the last 2 years terminated with 
the adoption of the Paris Agreement. The question in Paris, therefore, was, whether this 
process would continue, with what kind of mandate and where it should be housed under 
the UNFCCC architecture. Parties agreed to continue the series of TEMs, now dubbed 
“technical examination process” (TEP), under the joint auspices of SBI and SBSTA and to 
strengthen it by inter alia requesting the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the 
Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) to engage in the process and enhance 
their facilitative efforts. Also parties encouraged the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to engage 
in the process and to provide information with respect to its contribution to the imple-
mentation of policies and measures identified in the TEP. Paris provided also an extensive 
mandate for the Secretariat to organise the process and disseminate its results (UNFCCC 
2016b, paras. 109–113).
Many negotiators including early proponents of the format were, however, not very sat-
isfied with the current form of the TEP, in particular because a constructive discussion 
between delegates—being usually senior staff of ministries of the environment or foreign 
affairs—and highly specialised issue experts were difficult to maintain (experts A and B). 
In the words of one of the experts interviewed: “There was this global understanding that 
the process should help to increase ambition through scaling up and replicating best prac-
tices. The first part went very well in terms of identifying best practices […] but the second 
part—how the governments take these issues forward—was the weakness of the process so 
far” (expert C).
At COP23, this was also reflected in the decision text relating to the mandated review 
of the TEP for mitigation and adaptation, respectively. In particular, parties agreed to 
“strongly urge […] to focus the technical examination processes on specific policy options 
and opportunities for enhancing mitigation and adaptation that are actionable in the short 
term, including those with sustainable development co-benefits” (UNFCCC 2017, para. 2).
The general value of such technical processes for intergovernmental negotiations, 
though, is exemplified by the Technological and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP) 
under Article 6 of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
(United Nations 1989). In fact, the TEMs were proposed specifically with the success story 
of the TEAP in mind (expert B). The TEAP and its dependent issue-specific Technical 
Options Committees (TOCs) were paramount to driving ambition in the context of the 
Montreal Protocol (see Andersen 2015, p. 146). According to Andersen (2015), the interna-
tional cooperation of technical experts under the umbrella of the TEAP and its subcommit-
tees helped to inter alia resolve technical myths and misconceptions as well as to advance 
the development of new solutions by emancipating experts to integrate new insights also 
in their respective institutions and development of new technology. These advancements 
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paved the way for a gradual increase of the ambition and ultimately the success of the 
Montreal Protocol (Andersen and Sarma 2002; Gonzalez et  al. 2015). Consequently, de 
Bùrca et al. highlighted the TEAP and the TOCs as “they came to institutionalise the broad 
stakeholder participation, corrigibility of goals and continuous learning from performance 
monitoring that defines an experimentalist organization” (De Búrca et al. 2014, p. 482).
The incorporation of non-state and subnational actors, however, was not limited to the 
technical level. The first high-level political event featuring transnational climate initia-
tives was held at the occasion of COP20 in Lima to showcase good practices and provide a 
spotlight for policy makers to announce new initiatives and/or to increase the ambition of 
existing ones. Hosted by then COP-President Manuel Pulgar-Vidal, the event included con-
tributions from a wide range of stakeholders exceptional for a formal UNFCCC high-level 
event. Alongside the Secretary General of the United Nations also civil society representa-
tives, subnational governments and business representatives had the opportunity to speak 
(Ott et al. 2014). Manuel Pulgar-Vidal also launched the Non-state Actor Zone for Climate 
Action (NAZCA) (UNFCCC 2018), a web-based database maintained by the UNFCCC 
Secretariat in which all sorts of non-state and subnational actors can register their commit-
ments (see above).
The Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) was continued in Paris. The French COP Presi-
dency even considered the LPAA as the “fourth pillar of the Paris Agreement” (Ségolène 
Royal cited in Republique Française 2015). Meetings were held nearly every day on a 
divers set of issues. And the idea of putting climate initiatives on the spotlight worked well. 
Several high-profile initiatives were announced in the context of the LPAA. Most notewor-
thy perhaps are the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative  (AREI) of 54 African States that 
aims to install 300 GW of new renewable energy generation capacity by 2030, and “Mis-
sion Innovation”, an initiative to expedite research and development on low-carbon tech-
nologies, which is backed by an initiative of 28 billionaire investors headed by Bill Gates 
(Obergassel et al. 2015, 2016).
Building on these successes, parties have agreed to continue and expand the series of 
events under the auspices of so-called “high-level champions” through to 2020 (UNFCCC 
2016b, paras. 120–123). The first two champions—Laurence Tubiana, who had secured 
the Paris success as lead of the French COP Presidency team, and Hakima El Haite, Min-
ister Delegate in Charge of Environment of the Minister of Energy, Mining, Water and 
Environment of Morocco—further strengthened the engagement of non-state and subna-
tional actors inter alia by further developing the structure of the TEPs by e.g. setting up a 
dedicated website which summarises the results of TEPs in an accessible way (UNFCCC 
2016c). Their work culminated in the “Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action” 
or “Global Climate Action Agenda” (GCAA) adopted at COP22 that effectively amended 
and rebranded the LPAA (El Haite and Tubiana 2016; see also Kuyper et al. 2018). Its key 
features are:
• a more focussed mandate for the TEMs to be “focused on international collaboration 
and dialogue among Parties and non-Party Stakeholders” (El Haite and Tubiana 2016, 
p. 5);
• the establishment of regional thematic meetings with support of the UNFCCC’s 
Regional Collaboration Centres in Bangkok (Thailand), Bogotá (Colombia), Kampala 
(Uganda), Lomé (Togo), and St. George (Grenada);
• and an annual engagement cycle that takes advantage of the full year and not only of 
the annual COP and formal intersessional meetings.
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All this clearly demonstrates that the recognition of transnational climate initiatives by 
the UNFCCC is not only a lip service, but various technical and political fora exist in which 
achievements of transnational climate initiatives have been highlighted. Still, from the 
observations of the LPAA in Paris, one gets the impression that this recognition is rather a 
means to amplify and publicise the initiatives to the media and the outside world than as an 
input for the negotiation process. In fact, the LPAA was still rather detached from the core 
negotiations in Paris, not only in terms of content but also physically: the LPAA meetings 
were held at the official side event space in a building separate from the negotiation rooms. 
At COP23, this was even more salient as negotiations were held in a separate “Bula Zone” 
some 1.5 kilometres away from the “Bonn Zone” in which the “climate change trade-fair” 
was held with all side-events, expositions and spaces for stakeholder engagement. While 
this may have been a logistical necessity, it still contributed to the divide between the inter-
governmental negotiation process on the one hand and transnational engagement on the 
other.
All things considered, the few arenas open to input from non-state and subnational 
actors—reporting to the NAZCA platform, presenting in the TEP and highlighting initia-
tives in high-level events—had only a limited effect on negotiators and in particular the 
latter were directed mainly to an audience of observers and the press rather than party 
delegations. This clearly reflects what Widerberg and Pattberg have aptly described: “the 
‘international’ and the ‘transnational’ have been largely separated both in academia and in 
practice” (Pattberg and Widerberg 2015, p. 694).
3.2  Transnational initiatives and the national level
As indicated in Fig.  2 above, interaction between the transnational realm and intergov-
ernmental negotiations is not limited to the direct structuration channels discussed above, 
but also can occur indirectly but transnational initiatives can also feedback into the inter-
governmental process through influencing national discourses and national governments, 
respectively. Note that this section does not address the influence of transnational govern-
ance initiatives on national climate policies in general but focuses on deliberations at the 
national level with respect to a given countries stance in the intergovernmental negotia-
tions, inter alia the processes of developing and updating NDCs.
Probably, the most salient example for the non-state and subnational discursive power 
of non-state and subnational actors is the response of a myriad of US states, municipali-
ties, and businesses to the announcement by President Trump to withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement. Their activity culminated at COP23 when Michael Bloomberg, UN Special 
Envoy for Cities and Climate Change, and Jerry Brown, Governor of California, presented 
“America’s Pledge” on behalf of some 2300 states, cities and businesses from the United 
States of America who pledged their continued support to the Paris Agreement despite 
President Trump’s announcement to withdraw the United States from the Agreement 
(America’s Pledge 2017). Collectively, “America’s Pledge” covers 55 per cent of the US 
population and 40 per cent of the US annual emissions (Climate Interactive 2017). While 
the engagement of non-state and subnational actors, many of which are also members of 
larger transnational networks such as the Under-2-Coalition or the C40 cities network, 
may not be sufficient to fully compensate for the dismantling and role back of federal level 
policies in the US, it is estimated that the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement will have 
a relatively mild effect on US emissions (Betsill 2017; Cornwall 2017; Palacková 2017; 
Urpelainen and Van de Graaf 2017; Watts 2017).
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This response is encouraging with respect to the future of US climate policy perfor-
mance. As Michael Bloomberg put it: “Non-state actors are driving the bus” (quoted in 
Gupta and Sarkar 2017). But it is also challenging conventional perceptions: what does it 
tell about the United States’ sovereignty in foreign policy when the President announces to 
withdraw from an international agreement and at the same subnational authorities repre-
senting more than half the country’s population pledge their allegiance to the same agree-
ment, anyway? But this challenge is not only a theoretical one, but has started to show first 
practical implications: only days after President Trump’s announcement in the Rose Gar-
den of the White House, China’s President Xi Jinping met with Governor Brown of Cali-
fornia and struck a bilateral deal to boost cooperation on green technology (Office of Gov-
ernor of the State of California 2017). This was the first time ever that China had signed 
such an agreement with a subnational actor (see also Ott et al. 2017).
Beyond this kind of discursive influence, there may also be more direct and more for-
malised channels by which feedback from non-state and subnational actors can influence 
deliberations at the national level (see also Chan et al. 2018). Argentina was not only the 
first country to revise and substantially increase the ambition of its NDC after the Paris 
Agreement was adopted. In the process of revising its pledge, the federal Government 
organised an inclusive stakeholder engagement process and requested non-state and subna-
tional actors to submit their own contributions (UNDP 2017). The process was organised 
by a cross-ministerial cabinet (Gabinete Nacional de Cambio Climático). In order to collect 
the input from various actors, a series of sectoral roundtables were held. The implementa-
tion of Argentina’s NDC is now to be facilitated by a set of sectoral action plans which are 
again to be developed on the basis of input from non-state and subnational stakeholders 
(Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sustenable de la República Argentina 2017; see also 
Chan et al. 2018).
While the result of the deliberations, the revised Argentinian NDC is still rated “highly 
insufficient” to effectively attain the goals of the Paris Agreement (Climate Action Tracker 
2017), the inclusive process in which climate pledges from subnational and non-state 
actors were collated in order to inform and inspire the national ambition can serve as a 
blueprint for other countries as well (see Bäckstrand et al. 2017).
4  Discussion: how to close the feedback loop?
Both the theoretical model as well as well as the literature discussed in Sect.  2 suggest 
that “catalytic linkages” between the transnational realm of the global climate governance 
landscape and the intergovernmental negotiations could strengthen the global response to 
climate change. Yet, the empirical analysis demonstrates that currently, the ways in which 
transnational initiatives and the intergovernmental negotiation process interact is limited. 
Specifically, there is a significant imbalance in the sense that structuration may occur in 
one direct—from the UNFCCC and its negotiation process towards transnational initia-
tives—but feedback severely limited from the transnational realm into the intergovernmen-
tal negotiation process.
Numerous ways exist in which the UNFCCC Secretariat tries to coordinate and orches-
trate transnational actors, and with some success. The UNFCCC formally recognises the 
complementary role of transnational governance initiatives. Decisions taken in Paris and 
thereafter further promote this by providing a continued mandate for the TEPs and insti-
tutionalising it under the joint auspices of SBI and SBSTA. The continuation of what 
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started as the LPAA and has become the Global Climate Action Agenda is also a laudable 
development, as it provides an opportunity to communicate at an appropriate level new 
initiatives and/or increased level of ambition of existing coalitions. An important next step 
would be to establish these processes permanently, current mandates only cover the period 
until 2020.
Yet, the analysis also reveals, that “catalytic linkages” currently mostly run into one 
direction. While there is ample evidence that the efforts of coordinating and orchestrat-
ing the transnational realm are having some positive effect, there is actually very little that 
indicates that successful transnational governance resonates positively in the intergovern-
mental negotiations. Exemptions to this rule can be found where non-state and subnational 
actors have found ways to influence the national level directly, be it through discursive 
means as in the case of the United States or through more formal recognition and participa-
tion in deliberations at the national level like in Argentina.
Institutionalising mechanisms by which transnational governance initiatives can feed 
back into the intergovernmental negotiations could help address this shortfall. One way 
to do this would be to link the TEPs with provisions to be developed with respect to the 
matter of the global stocktake, the transparency framework, and possibly the facilitative 
compliance mechanism of the Paris Agreement Article 13 (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 13–15). 
The Paris Agreement has established a 5-yearly cycle (starting in 2023) “to take stock of 
the implementation of this Agreement to assess the collective progress […]. It shall do so 
in a comprehensive and facilitative manner” (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 15). As current NDCs 
are widely out of line with the Paris Agreements long-term goal (UNFCCC 2016d), the 
first global stocktake will almost certainly identify a significant gap. Transnational climate 
initiatives not only can contribute to close this gap, insights and experiences from trans-
national climate initiatives, condensed and refined through the TEPs, may help to identify 
viable solutions that can then be taken up by nation states in their subsequent NDCs.
Linking the TEPs with the transparency framework of the Paris Agreement would cre-
ate an even closer structuration channel. In Paris, Parties decided to launch a work pro-
gramme on the transparency framework (UNFCCC 2016b, paras. 91–98). The purpose 
of the transparency framework is inter alia to track progress towards achieving individual 
NDCs (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 13.5). The framework specifies information requirements 
and mandates a technical expert review. Explicitly, the “review shall also identify areas of 
improvement for the Party” (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 13.12). One open question is, whether 
the expert review should focus on the national inventories parties are obliged to submit 
(Art. 13.7a) and to what extent the information on the implementation and attainment of 
NDCs (Art. 13.7b) is the subject of external review. Specifically the latter could be facili-
tated by and through the TEPs. Reviewers should make specific recommendations for each 
country drawing on the portfolio of good practices developed and maintained in the TEPs. 
What is more, non-state actors could not only provide input in terms of good practices but 
could also help to hold national governments accountable by providing critical perspec-
tives on national reporting (see van Asselt 2016).
One step further even would be to link the TEPs to the compliance mechanism of the 
Paris Agreement. Article 15.2 establishes a compliance committee that is “facilitative in 
nature and function in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive” 
(UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 15.2). Formulating recommendations or requirements based on the 
results of the TEPs could strike a balance between the non-punitive and non-adversarial 
nature of the compliance committee, yet maintain some form of compulsion. Arguably, this 
would affect to some extent national sovereignty and may therefore be difficult to agree on 
internationally. But formulating the recommendations in the form of a directive that leaves 
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some leeway for the concerned Party with respect to the details of the implementation may 
reconcile these concerns.
Linking the outcomes of the TEPs more closely to the Paris Agreement’s transparency 
and compliance mechanisms would affect the structure of the TEPs themselves. On the one 
hand, having a more specific objective such as establishing a “policy menu” from which 
technical experts and the compliance committee can draw, could help the UNFCCC Sec-
retariat, the high-level champions as well as the respective COP Presidencies to structure 
the dialogues in a more focused way (see Höhne et al. 2014). On the other hand, it would 
certainly politicise the discussions. When the format of the technical expert meeting was 
put forward by AOSIS, the specific intention was to establish a “safe space” for facilita-
tive dialogue (expert B). However, most observers agree that such a facilitative and non-
political dialogue never really developed in the originally intended way anyway (experts A 
and B, author’s observation). Instead, the TEPs could become a hook to establish a more 
formal relationship between the intergovernmental regime and the wide range of transna-
tional governance.
5  Conclusions
This article made three separate contributions to the academic debate on the role of non-
state and subnational actors in the global governance landscape and in particular with 
respect to the relationship of the intergovernmental and transnational realms of it: firstly, 
it provided an explicit conceptualisation of the relationship between the intergovernmental 
negotiations on the hand and transnational governance efforts. This theoretical contribution 
complements earlier advances made that focussed on the role of non-state actors as “NGO 
diplomats” (Betsill and Corell 2008) but did not recognise the increasingly important role 
of numerous non-state and subnational actors as governors in their own right.
Secondly, it provides an empirical analysis of the state of play of the interplay between 
the highly dynamic field of transnational governance initiatives and how they are being rec-
ognised and appreciated in the intergovernmental negotiations. The UNFCCC has started 
to recognise transnational climate initiatives and the work of non-party actors in recent 
years, but to date the institutional design still largely resembles a structurational one-way 
street: the UNFCCC provides legitimation to transnational climate initiatives, but there is 
no way for such initiatives to immediately feed back some of the positive dynamics they 
have created.
Yet, the structurational regime model suggests that more tightly knit feedback loops 
between the two spheres of governance could help improve the efficacy of global climate 
governance. As a third contribution, the article has proposed to establish more direct struc-
turation channels in order to facilitate catalytic interactions by linking the (permanent) 
TEPs with key elements of the Paris Agreement: the global stocktake, the transparency 
framework and the compliance mechanism.
According to Keohane and Victor (2011), the climate change regime complex is organ-
ised non-hierarchically. The advent of the Paris Agreement now reconfigures this regime 
complex by introducing a new layer of hierarchy in and between the transnational and the 
international level to form of governance architecture that has been called “hybrid multilat-
eralism” (Bäckstrand et al. 2017, p. 562; Kuyper et al. 2018). The Paris Agreement is not 
hierarchically superior to transnational governance initiatives in that it has effective control 
over those initiatives. Yet, the results in terms of mitigation outcomes of (successful) trans-
national governance inevitably materialise in the GHG inventories of nation states. These 
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inventories, in turn, are pivotal in determining the adequacy of national climate governance 
and serve as critical input to subsequent climate policy goals in the cyclical NDC process 
deployed by the Paris Agreement. All transnational orchestration is vain if it does not reso-
nate with the intergovernmental process. At a point where time is the most important con-
straining factor of climate governance, productive interactions between the transnational 
and international levels should be maximised on all levels in order to exploit the comple-
mentarities of the various governance approaches.
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